Nicholas Shea’s ‘Swampman’ objection

The theory by Millikan holds that representations are normally physical details whose contents are compound relational properties of the same particulars and whose specifications can be done in the form of properties that are obtained from natural sciences. The theory relied on the function of trait in biological concept. The human and other animal behaviour is attributed to their actions which are based on internal representations. The intentionality nature and giving a materialist consciousness theory are the main problems in materialist view of mind philosophy. Thinking about the intentionality phenomenon raises questions about a representation being anything where a rational agent is not present. In addition, what consist of a belief cannot be simple characteristics of a certain mental state that are also synchronic relational. If relations and properties existing in natural science can be used to specify the compound relational property , the idea that the content of a representation can be specified using the representations , could be used to show how a space exist in natural world for the mystery of this intentionality. Showing that the representation’s ‘aboutness’ was only a compound relational element of a physical particular (Shea, 2016).

Millikan’s theory shows this aboutness as a relational property that is complex concerning the physical details. She managed to do this by relying on normative idea in biological view of function and 1970s’ work which proved the idea of biological function by acceptable realistically thereby it is easy to view a biological function as one of its normal physical properties. She also proved this by showing that biological functions could be arrayed in terms of those special systems that are representational to insist on such an account that is naturalistically acceptable (Shea, 2016). To clarify what is unique in representation, a new approach of turning to internationality in nature was suggested. Millikan internationality came from cases simpler than human recognition.  Her starting point was to consider the functions from an evolutionary point of view. While intending to explain species’ biological functions she considers evolutionary functions as a guide to current organisation. Millikan independently views normativity as part of content attribution and if it’s the only normative functions that are normative, most likely the functions can naturalise intentionality. Hence, swampan doesn’t have intentional states and with no history no norms can be related to the swamp state (Shea, 2016).

Reference

Shea, N. (2016). Millikan’s Contribution to Materialist Philosophy of Mind.1-22