Operational Iceberg
Introduction
Nearly Seventy-Five years ago, the American forces located in Pacific Ocean Areas formed a joint task force to conduct a campaign aimed at wrestling Okinawa Island from the Japanese forces. Okinawa Island is very important among the Ryukyu Group of Japanese island. The decision to carry out the invasion indicated that the United States was ready to infiltrate the inner ring of the enemies' defense forces. The ensuing operation Iceberg turned out to be as the American forces and Japanese forces lost thousands of soldiers including many civilians. The Operational ICEBERG involved the application of operational art and joint thinking by leaders of different services, which culminated in successful landing on Okinawa, and eventual surrender of Japanese forces.
- Ends Japanese threat to the ICERBERG Operation.
- The Japanese prepared an all-out air, land, and sea attack to repel any amphibious landing
- The kamikaze suicidal attacks presented a major hindrance to the entire operation
The planning and execution of Okinawa campaign – Operation Iceberg – saw the United States enter an advanced stage of carrying out its strategy in the Pacific during the World War II. The offensive concept as a basic strategy had been established by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, including a general timetable to be used in the Pacific War campaign with Japan (Appleman & Center of Military History, 2000). The strategy was established in Cairo during the 1943 Sextant Conference. The decision involved a convergence of two-pronged drives in the area to threaten by the Japanese. The drive along the New Guinea's Northern Coast was spearheaded by Southwest Pacific Area's Commander-in-Chief Douglas MacArthur, who directed the attack towards the Philippines (Appleman & Center of Military History, 2000). At the same time, the operation in Central Pacific towards Japanese' islands outposts was directed by Pacific Ocean Areas' Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. The objective was to have a convergence of various simultaneous and amphibious attacks on China Coast triangle in 1945's spring, as a preparation for the invasion of Japan (Appleman & Center of Military History, 2000). The decision ensured that the Navy and other elements of the armed forces maintained operations on both fronts as was deemed necessary. The advanced on the two axes resulted in increased pressure against the enemy Japanese defense forces and their naval might, which was the main objective of the strategy employed by the Americans.
The Objective of the Strategic Decision
The major objective of the Pacific operations was to target Japan's industrial center and Honshu's southern shores between the plains of Tokyo and Shimonoseki. The strategy's aim was to achieve this objective step by step and exploit the extreme vulnerability of the enemy to the blockade of the submarine, and bombardment by air (Appleman & Center of Military History, 2000). In the entire 1944 period, the Navy and Army personnel in the Pacific had been coming with a plan for Formosa invasion in the coming 1945 spring. The Formosa region was perceived as an Operation Causeway by the Americans. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed on March 1944 that a rough concept of the invasion be established, in addition to consideration and review of the available troops (Appleman & Center of Military History, 2000). The assignment of commanders for various taskforce was also announced. Hence, a CAUSEWAY study by a joint staff had already been established.
The plan indicated that an invasion on Formosa was clearly the intention of Admiral W. Nimitz after the establishment of various positions in Southern and Central Philippines by the Southwest Pacific forces. However, after the CAUSEWAY, an operation against the Bonin Islands and Ryukyu's Islands or against enemy forces in the China coast was to be pursued latter (Appleman & Center of Military History, 2000). Either way, the operation would finally result in an assault on the islands.
Ways
The Varying Strategic Opinions
The leaders of services at various bases had different strategic views on best decision. There was a change to the plan as of 15 September, whereby Gen. Douglas McArthur was directed by the Joint Chiefs to bypass Mindanao and capture Leyte on 20th October rather than 20th December (Zee, 1994). Simultaneously, Admiral Nimitz was directed to circumvent Yap but was to reconsider the Formosa operation the following day on the basis that advancing early into Central Philippines was highly likely to lead to a direct northward advancement through the islands instead of through China Coast and Formosa (Zee, 1994). Also, the early advance presented an opportunity to acquire the needed fleet anchorages. Thus, the Nimitz reviewed the CAUSEWAY's objectives so that establishing air basis would provide a front to support China, bomb Japan, and prevent the home islands from accessing resources from the south (Zee, 1994). He requested the opinion of the Army commanders on the new possibilities. However, Lt-Gen. Robert C. Richardson in charge of Pacific Ocean Areas insisted that only applicable plan should be made that would make the early achievement of Japan invasion, the main objective, possible.
He was skeptical of Formosa as a basis for advancing on Japan through China coast and opined that it did not provide advantages in line with enormous effort and time involved. The Lieutenant proposed the Marianas-Bonins and Luzon Ryukyus axes a more economical, in agreement with General MacArthur's strategy to capture Leyte then Luzon (Zee, 1994). The Luzon would make it possible to seize positions in Ryukyus from where the American forces would prosecute air operations against Honshu and Kyushu. The Commander General, U.S Army Air Forces, Lt-Gen. Millard F. Harmon, however, referred to his previous recommendation for Formosa and China Coast as effective bases for seizing the Ryukyu Islands, and development of air basis from which Japan could be bombed (Isaac, 2015). He emphasized the CAUSEWAY objective, which included the air bases acquisition, and the notion that the least cost in terms of material and men would be incurred in capturing Ryukyu positions.
Eventually, advancing to Ryukyu-Bonin Island's line after Luzon-Marianas become the preferred option, and the conception of the idea was done within the strategy of blocking and bombarding the enemy forces or any desire to resist. The capture of Okinawa would bring the war to Japan's threshold, disrupt their communication through the islands of Ryukyu, and edge the enemy's communication in the seas to the south (Isaac, 2015). The Okinawa Island was American's line of advance to the Japanese islands and to the coast of China. Aggressive and well-orchestrated campaigns and unexpected engagements in the entire Pacific war drama necessitated the reconsideration of the Sextant plan (Appleman & Center of Military History, 2000). As aforementioned, there was a consistent agreement on Formosa as an important objective among the different proposals. The Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered for preparation for Operation CAUSEWAY, which included an amphibious Formosa assault. It also directed preparation for Luzon recapture if such operations were deemed important before moving on Formosa (Appleman & Center of Military History, 2000). The plan was a reflection of a compromise resolution between the two divided perceptions of Pacific strategy, involving MacArthur's preference for Philippines and insistence by Admiral King for the main effort to be via Central Pacific.
The Okinawa Decision
Despite the directive by JCS in March 1944, the Pacific Strategy had not conclusively been reached making the situation on the ground to remain fluid. However, the Operation Iceberg plan indicated shrewd farsighted thinking, with great attention to flexibility, objective, synchronization and skillful use of combat power dynamics (Pitt & In Liddell, 1966). The opposition by Admiral Raymond Spruance to Formosa base was based on his vision for Japan as an end, and this can explain his insistence for the capture of Okinawa and Iwo Jima. Thus, his idea of strategy involved communication lines and geography, whereby application of exterior and interior lines as the basic principles. The principles shaped his view that capturing the interior communication lines of Marianas would allow advancement of U.S forces to the positions held by the enemy forces. Admiral Spruance preferred Okinawa due to its decisive point and prominent terrain. It would have meant that U.S forces would control the entire East China Sea front (Zee, 1994). Other leaders viewed Okinawa as just an effective base for the assault on Japan. However, the Formosa, which was King's desire, was reaffirmed by the August Staff. The Formosa strategy was also seen as an uneconomical, and thus, Marianas- Bonins and Luzon-Ryukyus strategy was considered (Pitt & In Liddell, 1966). Nevertheless, Nimitz presented a concrete argument that compelled King to do away with Operation CAUSEWAY and agreed to abandon Formosa and recommended Okinawa and Iwo Jima to the Joint Staff.
Noticeably, the decision that led to Operation ICEBERG was not to reach through joint planning as is currently understood. The decision involved every service coming up with a proposal that focused on capturing Okinawa but with varying reasons. From an operational point of view, Admiral Spruance saw Okinawa as the ground for interdicting Japanese communication lines and as a base for launching any upcoming operations in East China (Zee, 1994). The strategy would help in isolating Japan and avert any costs arising from assaulting Japan. Hence, each leader had a different view of Okinawa as a base of operation, but the flexibility of Joint Chief of Staffs and King indicates planning as a two-way street. The Okinawa selection resulted more-so from each service's self-interest and less from a common and unified strategy, but still, the leaders embraced the operational art and had great vision (Zee, 1994). Thus, the strategy involved consideration of both friendly and enemy capabilities, estimation of personnel and prevailing military to conditions to accomplish the set objectives of the battle.
Means
Operational ICEBERG Planning
Joint Operational Planning Process involves a systematic and analytical procedure comprising of specific steps in examining a mission. It entails developing, analyzing and comparing different courses of actions, choosing the best course of action and coming up with an order (MULLEN, 2006). The goal in the Pacific War was to ensure the surrender of Japan. The various operational commanders appeared to have divergence views on the strategic center of gravity of Japan and proper manner of invasion. Arnold and Lemay seemed to view the Japanese people to be the Center of Gravity, which informed the Empire Plan execution, that in turn lead to the striking of mainland's urban areas leading torn annihilation of 64 cities (Zee, 1994). While Lemay saw the possibility of forcing Japan to surrender before the final invasion, US forces perceived that the destroying Japanese Military would achieve the same. That Spruance believed a line of effort through the East China Sea and blockages of resources were significant indications that he recognized the people's will (Matheny, 2014). However, considering the Japanese materialistic society, it would rightly be concluded that the center of gravity was based on both the military and the people's will.
Okinawa became the eventual operational objective since it would make it possible to achieve the main strategic goal. Kamikaze became the center of gravity for the operation since it could endanger the amphibious stage, and thus, a lot of effort, time, and resources were directed towards neutralizing this threat. The efforts by Lemay to destroy Japanese aircraft using B-29s were negligible, and this prompted Spruance to order for bombing aircraft factories, aircraft, and even airfields on the Kyushu (Zee, 1994). A lot of effort was focused on objective area isolation and obtaining dominance in the battle-space. A month before the landing, Okinawa, and Kyushu were struck by B-29s from Marianas and China, while Forward Area Central Pacific Force‘s naval carried out anti-submarine operations, offered logistic support, and defused other enemy bases left behind (Zee, 1994). The Submarine Force Pacific Fleet interdicted any Japanese approaching from Formosa and Japan and offered the needed intelligence. The role of neutralizing the enemy air was majorly assigned to Fast Carrier Force. A week before the invasion, the Fast Carrier Force had isolated Okinawa while supporting the operation with patrols and strikes (Zee, 1994). Meanwhile, the air installations Ryukyu's southwest were defused by British Carrier Force, and other units carried out aerial search, air reconnaissance, and engaged in anti-submarine combat (Zee, 1994).
The Operational ICEBERG involved three phases: The capture of Southern Okinawa to allow the establishment of operation base; Le Shima occupation and Northern Okinawa control; capture and establishment of more islands to be used in future. Since Operation ICEBERG needed considerable corporation and coordination of the above services in any logistic and operational challenges, the process of planning was done synchronously. Hence, interoperability among various functions including having a common intelligence center, integration of supporting arms, and every part of logistics. The commanders of the task force and various corps developed plans together to accomplish the different amphibious operations (Appleman & Center of Military History, 2000). Moreover, the joint planning efforts led to significant modifications and decisions during the entire Operation ICEBERG.
The campaign also involved operation fires, which consisted of Carrier Task Force and AFF strikes that aimed at containing and neutralizing the Kamikaze effects (Appleman & Center of Military History, 2000). The fires allowed friendly maneuver, battlefield isolation, and destruction of key facilities and functions of the enemy. The ICEBERG execution was enabled by the allocation of assets, coordination of activities, and de-confliction of operation lines, which culminated in a successful implementation of the developed strategic plan. The success is indicated by the fact that the Okinawa amphibious landing was completed unopposed, while the lethal nature of gunfire support from the navy made Japanese commander of the garrison to reconsider his defensive strategy (Zee, 1994). He decided to engage the American's island.
Risks
The commanders of U.S forces and other allied forces had a common understanding of the kind of threat posed by Japan. The Japanese had expected an attack on Ryukyu Islands, and considered an all-out air, land, and sea attack to repel any amphibious landing by its enemies. The US forces knew that the Japanese’ Kamikaze air force would embark on suicidal attacks that it had employed before during the Leyte Gulf Battle. The suicidal attacks presented the greatest threat to US amphibian lands in the Ryukyus. Moreover, the Okinawa airfields and the many bases possessed by the Japanese at the islands were a major risk to the operation. The bases could also be found in Formosa and on the Chinese front which were strategic areas for the objective of the Campaign.
The Japanese also understood the value of the islands, and their presence placed the US bombers within the range of home islands of the enemy. The adoption of Ketsu-Go policy by the new prime minster, Kantaro Suzuki pictured a mass mobilization of citizens as military personnel to take part in the suicide attacks. The extent the Japanese were willing to go to defend the islands against outside invasion presented a major risk to the entire operation
Conclusion
The operational art and joint thinking application by the services' leaders ensured that the Operation ICEBERG campaign achieved the desired objective of seizing Okinawa. The campaign involved continuous deliberations of the best courses of action, and since the leaders held different views on the best way forward, engagement and coordination ensured all units focused on the main goal. The consideration of varying opinions and ideas enabled the leaders to conduct operations according to what suited their units, but their efforts culminated in common victory.
References
Isaac, E. (2015). Operation ICEBERG: How the Strategic Influenced the Tactics of LTG Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. at Okinawa.
Appleman, R. E., & Center of Military History, (2000). Okinawa: The last battle. Washington, D.C: Center of Military History, U.S. Army. Pp.1-66. Retrieved from: https://etd.auburn.edu/bitstream/handle/10415/4906/Evan_Isaac_Operation_Iceberg_V2.pdf;sequence=2
Matheny, M. R. (2014). Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945 (3rd Ed). Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. pp. 202-250
Zee, R. (1994). Operational Perspectives of the Okinawa Campaign (Operation Iceberg). Naval War Coll Newport RI. Pp.6-21
Pitt, B., & In Liddell, H. B. H. (1966). History of the Second World War. Paulton (Som.: Purnell).pp.2572
MULLEN, M.G, (26th December, 2006). JP 5-0, Joint Planning. Retrieved from: https://grugq.github.io/resources/jp5_0.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A282%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C-293%2C804%2C0.75%5D
