The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Introduction

The primary objective of this analysis is to determine whether a conflict of interest emerges when Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is given the responsibility to conduct covert action. The analysis will thus evaluate the probable effects that may emerge when National Clandestine service (NCS) is mandated to perform tasks of both Covert Action (CA) and collecting information on behalf of CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI) for the analysis of strategic intelligence. For the benefit of determining the likelihood of cross-conflict, the analysis at first breaks up NCS into its units in order to make clear the major purposes of each unit. In addition, the analysis in turn discusses reasons behind the incompatibility of activities tasked to CIA and so, prospecting a conflict of interest.

CIA uses the National Clandestine Service (NCS) as an underground channel of gathering secret information in various backgrounds.  NCS’s major tasks include management of counterintelligence activities and other intrigued practices under jurisdictions of the president (Phillips 2015, 36). Intelligence operations underline two major operations; covert actions and HUMINT operations which define differing interests in the intelligence community. The role of HUMINT operations includes production of intelligence in response to a nation’s need to determine its enemies. It is as well responsible for the determination of capabilities of the rivals and aptitude of rival’s intentions towards the conformity of our nation. On the contrary, covert actions encompass investigation of manipulative information and other politically motivated activities guided to cause unpredictable impacts to the regime (Clark 2016, 58).  This brings up a perception that HUMINT and covert operations should not be aligned together in spite of their concurring objectives.

As opposed to the desired worthiness of the two operations, CIA includes objectives of both CA and HUMINT together and so, enhancing existence of contradicting interests in due course. This came as a result of rearrangement of CIA caused by Eisenhower’s administration that highly compromised covert operations in comparison to prior alignment which operated covert and HUMINT operations from different settings (Ibp Inc, 2013, 110). Inclusion of both covert and HUMINT operations under same management and from same offices causes affluent contradictions which hinders accomplishment of one action and at the same time enhancing success of concurrent operation. For instance, the two departments encompass significant challenges in the allocation of resources including money as well as manpower. The needed efficacy of covert efficacy over HUMINT operations leads to the deterioration of human intelligence since most occurrences resources are focused to success covert desires. Nevertheless, the alignment insinuates that CIA recruits more officers into covert missions due to its efficacy in relation to HUMINT Intelligence which in most cases is considered less influential.

Enclosure of both operations documents that a failure in one operation supposes a failure to the other hence contradicting all operations. Covert failure for example commonly triggers unavoidable consequences capable to facilitate severe impacts and in due course hindering success of HUMINT investigations. For example, Smith (2009, 1) exemplifies that United States has in the past encompassed a lot of negative publicity especially from other nations such as Iran due to failures in operations of covert action which brings up a perception that pessimistic publicity is likely to deter CIA’s efficacy to conduct clandestine intelligence in such nations. It is logical to situate that the CA and HUMINT should not be assigned as components with similar objectives since in practicality they define differing intelligence level (Green 1993, 7). Nevertheless, governance of the nation is reliant to itemized information of both CA and HUMINT thus it insubstantial to settle the mandate of handling delicate operations of both to one managing body. It is contradictory for example to manage HUMINT collection and to direct CA’s programs under the governance of CIA without supposing inefficacies.

The merger of covert action and human intelligence as per the guidelines of Eisenhower administration continues to cause operations unpredictability and also induces psychological uneasiness. Suggestible, it is absurd to predict practical success of comprehensive information gathering especially in various political realms internationally under one management. The two actions demands planned, organized and well prepared methodologies and frequently CA’s objectives may include different operational ideologies from those required by HUMINT thus deterring decision making (Green 1993, 7). Difference between operational requirements is true to form a conflict of interest. On the other hand, psychological differences enhance the unworthiness of the merger. For instance, psychological objectives of covert action at times encompass recurrent procedures for accomplishment which a lot fluctuate from psychological objectives of HUMINT which give emphasis to lengthy preparation to success its outcomes.

Covert action is majorly responsible for very partial operations which by all accounts are prone to propagandas and other political inconsistencies (Bruneau & Boraz 2009, 80). This insinuates that covert actions should always intermediate strategically modified techniques of collecting intelligence to purposely cope with propagandas particularly from political inconsistencies. For this reason, CIA agents oriented to conduct activities of covert are expected to focus in accordance to their original plan since CA in most occurrences characterizes aspects of inflexibility. On the contrary, HUMINT specializes in the collection of counterespionage, counterintelligence and positive intelligence. This illustrates that HUMINT exemplify notions such as fluency, delicacy and flexibility in order to element operational quality. It is thus important to clarify combination of both operations is prone to acquirement absurd information due to differences in interests and equipped principles.  

Conclusion

The primary purpose of CIA’s operations is to gather and deliver relevant information to the Directorate of Intelligence in order to alleviate policy making. It is important to note that contradiction of CIA’s operations fronts affluent threats to the nation at large. The foregoing analysis has potentially enumerated the supposed irrelevancy of information that CIA lends to DI. For instance, CIA has up to date dealt with considerable challenges as a result of gradual evolution in its structure. The supposed evolution has reorganized CIA’s operational structure and so, facilitated the incompatibility of the combination between HUMINT and CA. Inaptness of the two consequently obstructs formulation, compilation and presentation of national intelligence. Evidently, the merger of CA and HUMNINT enhances emergence of a conflict of interest as a result of purpose incompatibility between the two units.

Work Cited