Philosophy
In the Philosophy of Language, Frege showed interest in understanding the identity and the relation between object and names. Frege realized that it is not possible to derive a logical meaning of a sentence through focusing on names and descriptions. Rather, words in a sentence have a sense and a reference which have semantic relations. When thinking about this issue, he understood that relation between objects would mean a=a and a=b (Frege, 2002). However, Frege does not agree with this but he argues that there are valuable extensions from astronomical discovery that a=a is not a=b. The reader may conclude that a=a is true and a=b is informative but according to philosophical thought, Frege states that both have different identity. Frege adds that if two signs present a similar object, then relation between the two makes an identity. However, a=b is just a statement of identity which presents two modes of presentation (Frege, 2002).
Having understood identity, one can be in a position to distinguish reference and sense by having a comprehensive knowledge which will assist in distinguishing whether a sense represents an object. In addition, the knowledge will help identify references and associated senses. On the theory of sense and reference, Frege states that reference does not contain a meaning and the latter is derived from a sense of expression (Frege, 2002). In making a distinction between the reference and a sense, he states that objects have the same reference but different senses. In his argument, Frege introduces the identity statement where he says that evening star=morning star. This puzzle contains valuable extensions which then contribute to problems of objects and identity. In this case, identity is derived from relating the objects, that is, evening start is morning start and evening start is evening start. However, Frege puts emphasize that two objects do not form an identity but what happens is that identify is formed from relation between names (Frege, 2002). In other words, evening start is morning start- meaning that there are two names with the same denotation.
On sense and reference, Frege assert that a=a and a=b have different senses and cognitive value. Similarity is seen in modes of presentation and one is able to distinguish between truth and thoughts. Frege says that sign, sense and reference have different expressions. In explaining the expression of identity-statements, the main problem with identity is derived from object relations. In solving the problem, Frege shows that identity has a binary function, that is, ordinary objects with truth-value (Kripke, 2008). The Sense and Reference theory states that there is a relation between objects between names. For example, there is a cognitive connection between a=a and a=b because the former has a prior while the latter does not have. In addition, one can solve the problems of identity by understanding that a name has a reference and a sense. The reader also understands that a and b present a similar object but have different senses (Kripke, 2008).
One can solve identity problems by understanding that different senses can contain similar references which signifies cognitive significance. Frege solves substitutivity problems of identity statements. For example, morning start and evening start differ in sense. Since a sense determines reference, it contains truth and falsehood. The truth-value is derived from sentence’s dimension and the sentence can change its expression and retain its truth-value. To sum up, Frege shows that there is a difference between the reference (denotation) and the sense (connotaion). The reference is direct and the sense is indirect since both have different ideas (Kripke, 2008). He puts emphasize that a and b are identical names with different meaning. In his philosophical work, Frege offers a descriptive theory which allows the reader understands that object descriptions creates a semantic concept in a sentence. Sense helps the reader understand the objects described in a sentence. The sense acts as a mode of presentation and it also determines reference. Frege informs the reader that sense and reference are joined by signification and meaning (Kripke, 2008).
Frege‘s objection on sense/reference distinction is that the meaning is expressed with respect to the object. In other words, he does not agree that words or thoughts are ideas. He understands that in order to solve the problems of identity, the expression and truth of a word in sentence is reinforced by the sense. Frege employs a logical language and asserts that sentences express meaningful sense and truth-value (Kripke, 2008). In Frege’s philosophical work, identity statement is characterized by the name-view and object-view which are found in sentences with referring terms. The views contribute to problem in identity statement. For example, the name-view means that a and b presents a similar object. One is able to solve identity problems by understanding that a=a and a=b have different cognitive meanings (Kripke, 2008). In addition, the cognitive significance is derived from the sense the reader is also informed that names gives an identity since difference names have different cognitive value. In addition, a and b are informative since they have different mode of presentation.
Reference
Frege Gottlo. (2002). Sense and Reference. The Philosophical Review, Volume 57, Issue 3
Retrieved from: http://www.naturalthinker.net/trl/texts/Frege,Gottlob/Frege,%20Gottlob%20-%20Sense%20and%20Reference.pdf
Kripke A. Saul. (2008). Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes. 74, 181-218
Retrieved from: http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Kripke%20-%20Frege%20Sense%20Reference.pdf
