Informed Reflection & Feedback

Moral Realism/Relativism

On moral relativism and realism, philosophers and ethicists say that there is no true morality. In other words, people from different cultures and backgrounds have different moralities (Enoch, 2009).They also assert that individuals fail to accept realism due to moral disagreement in cross-cultures. For example, Westerners believe that non-Western cultures are inferior, arrogant and intolerant. This intuitive thought influences cross-culture disagreement. An important point to understand is that the disagreement leads to denial of realism. In other words, people arrive at the moral truth using self-evident moral principles which is not empirical truth but own principles (Enoch, 2009). This means that people use self-evidence to define realism.

 Another important point to note is that moral realists believe that some moral claims are true whereas others are false. This raises the moral disagreements in that some people make moral claims on certain things and but the reported facts lack evidence (Enoch, 2009).  Since disagreement arise when people try to express their emotion and interest, it means that people should not use moral disagreement to deny moral realism. In other words, disagreement does have indictment but rather disagreement means differences. Thus, individuals should acknowledge the different or rather the negative views (Enoch, 2009).  If people would understand moral disagreement as a way of expressing emotion and interest, people would not define other cultures as inferior, and there would be no criticism. 

 The engagement with the materials has confirmed my initial thoughts that people express moral disagreements in trying to present their claim toward a certain issue. Concerning ethics, people present their self-evident truths or rather a truth that has no justification (Enoch, 2009).  However, it is important to view the moral disagreement as claims which have been carefully examined and that contain strong moral reason.

 

Reference

 Enoch David. (2009). How Is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism? The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 13, No. 1 pp. 15-50. Springer

Moral Realism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Moral Relativism & Realism