CHALLENES TO CHAGE: RESISTANCE & RESILIENCE

NASA delayed in implementing safety standards and this led to the loss of life of seven astronauts. NASA’s institutional practices were the root cause of the accident (Howell, 2013).  The organization showed inadequate concern and it presented ‘a silent safety program’.  This bad culture had long-term effects and it has depreciated given that for many years it has relied on outsourcing and rather than promoting safety they concentrate on ‘Faster, better, cheaper’.  Despite the fact that NASA knew about the foam in the space, managers believed that foam-shedding was inevitable and was a ‘turnaround issue’ (Dick & Launius, 2006). According to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, NASA had not created change till 1980 and there were no effective checks and balances as well as safety programs. Investigation also found that NASA is an organization with risk-avoidance system and it has the responsibility to ensure that astronauts are safe while in the space. However, NASA caused Columbia tragedies due to “normalization of deviance” (Dick & Launius, 2006). Prior to the tragedy, there was a foam containing ice in the Columbian orbiter which damaged the internal structure of the left wing and this resulted to loss of control.  Research said that foam is not dangerous but the   problem was that the heavier foam led to the accident and NASA could evaluate the ‘flight safety’ risk. The NASA’s upper management was not interested in investigating the safety and implementing change (Dick & Launius, 2006).

NASA should know that in today’s organization, change is inevitable and organization must modify management structures in order to survive. In order to develop a safety culture, the organization should implement positive behaviors and practices (Entwhistle, 2011). Focusing on the Columbian accident and NASA’s failure, the best strategy to overcome resistant is to commitment leadership. Note that engineers showed concern on the problems but the top management (senior NASA managers) had a bureaucratic mindset and they were not ready for change.  As leaders, they should show commitment ands this will help to make clear decisions and clear mission statements (Entwhistle, 2011).

Reference

Howell, E. (2013). Columbia disaster: What happened, what NASA learned. Retrieved from http://www.space.com/19436-columbia-disaster.html

Dick J. Steven & Launius D. Roger. (2006). Critical issues in the history of spaceflight. Government Printing

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Entwhistle, T. (2011). For appropriateness or consequences? Explaining organizational change in English

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